5th Circuit Court of Appeals Upholds Termination of Wife-Swapping Deputies

There is an interesting case that would normally fall in the “Hard to Believe” category and remembered only for its entertainment value. Unfortunately, the case comes out of the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals. Therefore, the case sets precedent in the federal court circuit in which we live. The case is Brandon Coker and Michael a Golden v. Julian Whittington and Charles Owens. The case arises out of the Western District of Louisiana (we are in the Eastern District of Louisiana) and involves two Sheriff’s Deputies. Since they are Sheriff’s Deputies, they are at-will employees and do not have Civil Service protection.

The case involves two employees of the Bossier Parish Sheriff’s Office, Coker and Golden. Coker and Golden swapped wives. Actually, they swapped families. Golden moved into Coker’s house and Coker moved into Golden’s house. Nothing else changed and nobody got divorced. When Chief Deputy Owens learned of this arrangement, he told Golden and Coker that they either went back to their own homes or they would be considered voluntarily terminated. Needless to say, the two deputies did not comply with the Chief Deputy’s instructions. They were terminated for a provision of the Sheriff’s Code of Conduct that states employees must “Conduct yourselves at all times in such a manner as to reflect the high standards of the Bossier Sheriff’s Office … [and] Do not engage in any illegal, immoral, or indecent conduct, nor engage in any legitimate act which, when performed in view of the public, would reflect unfavorabl[y] upon the Bossier Sheriff’s Office.” This is similar to NOPD’s Professionalism rule. They were also charged with failing to notify a supervisor of a change of address within 24 hours.

One thing that is disconcerting about this case is that Coker and Golden lost not once, but twice – Western District and the 5th Circuit. The District Court held that the disciplinary action was to be upheld because the policies at issue are “supported by the rational grounds of preserving a cohesive police force and upholding the public trust and reputation of the Sheriff’s Department.”

The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals held that precedent in the 5th Circuit has uniformly upheld terminations for sexually inappropriate conduct. Furthermore, the Court held that there are no decisions which stand for the proposition that an officer’s freedoms to associate under the 1st Amendment means freedom to associates with the other’s wife before a formal divorce. They went on to say that pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Garcetti, public employees “shed some of their constitutional rights as a legitimate exchange for the privilege of their positions.” They went on to say the rule was not constitutionally vague.

The rest of the justification for the holding speaks best for itself. So, here is the Court’s reasoning:

We find no reversible error of fact or law in the district court’s decision. Sexual decisions between consenting adults take on a different color when the adults are law enforcement officers. Their enforcement duties include, for instance, crimes of human trafficking and spousal abuse that place them in sensitive positions with members of the public. Their involvement in relations that openly and “notoriously” violate the legally sanctioned relationships of marriage and family is likely to besmirch the reputation of the Sheriff’s Department and hinder its ability to maintain public credibility. Moreover, these officers’ extramarital relationships, even if consensual and loving at the outset, have great potential to create internal dissension within the force. Finally, it is not hard to envision how the existence of Coker’s and Golden’s cohabitation with each other’s wives prior to divorce and remarriage might be adversely used in litigation concerning the deputies’ official conduct.

 

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Obergefell v. Hodges does not alter applicable law. ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2598, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). Whatever ramifications Obergefell may have for sexual relations beyond the approval of same-sex marriage are unstated at best, but Obergefell is expressly premised on the unique and special bond created by the formal marital relationship and children of that relationship. Id. at 2594–95. Obergefell does not create “rights” based on relationships that mock marriage, and no court has so held.

While I don’t think I would recommend house-swapping, I am baffled by the connection between an officer’s ability to investigate human trafficking or domestic violence and the officers’ decisions to swap households. The moral to this story is that, as law enforcement officers, one cannot rely on the Constitution to provide the protection is does for everyone else – at least in the eyes of some ultra conservative jurists.

The case can be downloaded here (.pdf): Coker v. Whittington, 858 F.3d 304, 2017 WL 2240300 (C.A.5 (La.)), 2 (C.A.5 (La.), 2017)

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U.S. Fifth Circuit Case Update – 1st Amendment and Terry Stops

See the below two cases for important case law out of the U.S. 5th Circuit.  Case summaries compiled by The Federal Law Enforcement Informer, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC).

United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. Tex. Feb. 2, 2017)

While on patrol in a marked police car, two officers saw Monsivais walking on the side of an interstate highway away from an apparently disabled truck. The officer stopped the patrol car in front of Monsivais and activated the car’s emergency lights, planning to ask Monsivais if he needed assistance. As Monsivais approached, he ignored the officers and walked past their patrol car. At this point, the officers exited their vehicle, and asked Monsivais where he was going, where he had been and if he needed any help. Monsivais told the officers where he was going, and while he appeared to be nervous, he responded politely to all of the officers’ questions. After approximately four-minutes, one of the officers told Monsivais that he was going to pat Monsivais down for weapons “because of his behavior” and for “officer safety reasons.” Monsivais then told the officer that he had a firearm in his waistband. The officer seized the firearm and the government subsequently charged Monsivais with possession of a firearm while being unlawfully present in the United States.

Monsivais filed a motion to suppress the firearm. Monsivais argued that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment because he did not have reasonable suspicion to believe Monsivais was involved in criminal activity when he detained him.

The court agreed. First, the court determined that the officer seized Monsivais for Fourth Amendment purposes when he told Monsivais that he was going to pat him down. At this point, the officer had converted an offer for roadside assistance into an investigative detention or Terry stop.

Second, the court noted that police officers may briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if they can point to “specific and articulable facts” that give rise to reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

Third, the court concluded that while Monsivais’ behavior might not have been typical of all stranded motorists, the officer could not point to any specific and articulable facts that Monsivais had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime before seizing him. The officer testified that he never suspected Monsivais was involved in criminal activity, but rather that Monsivais was acting “suspicious.” As a result, the court found that the officer seized Monsivais without reasonable suspicion and that the firearm seized from Monsivais should have been suppressed.

For the court’s opinion: http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/15-10357/15-10357-2017-02-02.pdf?ts=1486081834

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Turner v. Driver, 848 F.3d 678 (5th Cir. Tex. Feb. 16, 2017)

In September 2015, Turner was videotaping the Fort Worth Police Station from a public sidewalk across the street from the station. During this time, Fort Worth Police Officers Grinalds and Dyess pulled up in their patrol car and approached Turner. Officer Grinalds asked Turner if he had identification, but Turner continued videotaping. When Turner asked the officers if he was being detained, Officer Grinalds told Turner that he was being detained for investigation because the officers were concerned about who was videotaping their building. After Turner refused Officer Grinalds’ continued request for identification, the officers handcuffed Turner, took his video camera, and placed Turner in their patrol car.

A short time later a supervisor, Lieutenant Driver, arrived and spoke briefly with Turner as well as Officers Grinalds and Dyess. After Lieutenant Driver left, the officers went back to their patrol car, released Turner, and returned his video camera to him.

Turner sued Lieutenant Driver and Officers Grinalds and Dyess under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming that they violated his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments. The officers filed a motion to dismiss Turner’s suit, claiming they were entitled to qualified immunity.

First, the court found that at the time of the incident, in the Fifth Circuit1, there was no clearly established First Amendment right to record the police2. As a result, the court held that all three officers were entitled to qualified immunity as to Turner’s First Amendment claim.

Although the right was not clearly established at the time of Turner’s activities, the court held that going forward in the Fifth Circuit, a First Amendment right to record the police exists subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. The court did not determine which specific time, place, and manner restrictions would be reasonable, but stated that restrictions must be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest.”

Concerning Turner’s Fourth Amendment claims, the court held that the officers’ initial questioning and detention of Turner, before he was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car was reasonable. The court noted that an objectively reasonable person in Officer Grinalds’ or Dyess’ position could have suspected that Turner was casing the station for an attack or stalking an officer. As a result, the officers could have found Turner’s videotaping of the station sufficiently suspicious to warrant questioning and a brief detention.

However, the court held that Officers Grinalds and Dyess were not entitled to qualified immunity on Turner’s claim that handcuffing him and placing him in the officers’ patrol car amounted to an unlawful arrest. The court found that a reasonable person in Turner’s position would have understood the officers’ actions constituted a restraint on his freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The court commented that the officer’s actions in this regard were disproportionate to any potential threat that Turner posed or to the investigative needs of the officers. Consequently, the court concluded that handcuffing Turner and placing him in the patrol car was not reasonable under the circumstances.

Finally, the court held that Lieutenant Driver was entitled to qualified immunity as to Turner’s Fourth Amendment claims. First, under §1983, supervisors are not liable for the direct actions of their subordinates. Second, by the time Lieutenant Driver arrived, Turner had already been handcuffed and placed in the officers’ patrol car. Third, after Lieutenant Driver arrived, he immediately investigated the situation by talking with Officers Grinalds and Dyess as well as Turner, and he then promptly ordered Turner’s release.

1 The First and Eleventh Circuits have held that the First Amendment protects the rights of individuals to videotape police officers performing their duties.

2 While no circuit has held that the First Amendment does not extend to the video recording of police activity, the Third, Fourth and Tenth Circuits have held that the law in their circuits is not clearly established, without specifically determining whether such a right exists under the First Amendment.

For the court’s opinion: http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-10312/16-10312-2017-02-16.pdf?ts=1487291433

The Garrity Case and Law Enforcement Officers

Garrity v. State of New Jersey, 87 S.Ct. 616 (Jan. 16, 1967) is a very important case for law enforcement officers everywhere.  It is also widely misunderstood and there are aspects of its implementation that are as of yet undecided.  The fact that this case is very important to law enforcement officers and still widely misunderstood underscores the value of the FOP Legal Defense Plan and attorneys who practice law on behalf of law enforcement officers every day.

It has been well-documented that one of the biggest legal issues people face is that they cannot afford access to the legal assistance they need.  Many legal issues go unaddressed.  I am sure that if you haven’t experienced this yourself, you probably know someone who has.  The FOP Legal Plan helps FOP members access the legal services they need.  I cannot say this enough:  Pick up the phone and call.  It doesn’t matter how important or unimportant it seems, pick up the phone and call.  As an FOP member, you have access to legal professionals at no cost to you beyond your monthly dues.  Pick up the phone and call.  Now, on to Garrity v. State of New Jersey.

Six individuals, including Police Chief Edward Garrity, four police officers, and a clerk of court were investigated by the New Jersey Attorney General at the direction of the New Jersey Supreme Court in connection with a ticket fixing racket.  During questioning, the employees were advised that:

  1. Anything he or she said might be used in a criminal proceeding;
  2. He or she had the privilege to refuse to answer if the answer would tend to be self-incriminatory; and
  3. Refusal to answer would be cause for removal from office.

The answers to their questions were used in their prosecution, over their objections, to secure their conviction for conspiracy to obstruct the administration of traffic laws.  The convictions were affirmed by the New Jersey Supreme Court and an appeal was taken to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the convictions, holding that police officers were “not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.”  Basically, the U.S. Supreme Court held that since they were given the choice of self-incrimination or job-forfeiture, the statements were coerced.  Since the statements were coerced, they were inadmissible.

We now hold the protection of the individual under the Fourteenth Amendment against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or other members of our body politic.

Garrity v. State of N.J., 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S. Ct. 616, 620, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967).

What that boils down to for police officers is that any time their employer, or someone who is authorized to terminate the officer’s employment, informs an officer that the choice is answer questions or be fired, those answers, and any fruits of those answers, will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings against that officer.

First issue:  The person asking the questions must have the authority to terminate the officer’s employment.  For example, if an FBI Agent tells a city police officer that they are required to answer questions or be terminated, Garrity does not apply.  If a city police officer is ordered by his employer to answer the Agent’s questions or be fired, then clearly Garrity will control.

Second issue:  In order for Garrity to control, the officer must reasonably believe that he will be terminated should he refuse to answer.  If the penalty for refusing to answer is minor or non-existent, the answers will be considered voluntary and will be admissible.  It is preferable to have this ultimatum in writing.  At the very least, it should be audio recorded.  If it is not in writing or read into the record by someone in a position of authority, the officer will have to prove that he had a reasonable belief that he was under an order to answer questions or face termination.  This is not a sure thing.

Third issue:  Garrity does not stand for the proposition that officers have the option of refusing to answer incriminating statements.  It only stands for the proposition that police officers cannot be coerced into making incriminating statements by threatening their employment.  The cases known as Uniformed Sanitation I and Uniformed Sanitation II address refusal to answer and, basically, if the statements are immunized, an officer can be terminated for refusing to answer.

Fourth issue:  Garrity protects an officer from incriminating himself.  It does not mean that the statements cannot be used against someone else.

Fifth issue:  Garrity stands for the proposition that coerced statements are inadmissible in a criminal proceeding.  That may not include grand jury proceedings.

There are many other questions about the application of Garrity.

  • Can the ADA get copies of Garrity protected statements?  Yes.  If they do, they run the risk of having evidence ruled inadmissible as a result.  The DA may very well be able to use Garrity statements for Grand Jury proceedings.
  • What is the remedy if an ADA gets copies of Garrity protected statements?  That depends.  If it is possible to continue the prosecution if the statements or their fruits are excluded, it could be continued.  If, however, the statements or their fruits are so intertwined with the prosecution that there is no way to separate them from excluded statements, then the remedy could be dismissal.
  • What about statements made in police reports?  While officers are probably required to complete police reports or face disciplinary action, statements in police reports are not likely to qualify as immunized statements.  In general, statements made in the normal and usual course of business will not be immunized statements.
  • What if I write in my own Garrity warning?  There is a school of thought that if an officer perceives that he is answering questions under a thread of termination, that he should write that in.  I do not see a downside to that.  However, there is no real reason to believe it will be successful.
  • If I am ordered to answer questions, can I assert my 5th Amendment right to remain silent?  No.  In the Uniformed Sanitation II case, the court held that once you are immunized, you no longer have the right to remain silent.
  • Do the holdings in Garrity apply to breathalyzers, blood tests, etc.?  No.  Garrity applies ONLY to statements (testimonial or communicative communication).  See Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (June 20, 1966).
  • Are the contents of police reports subject to the provisions of Garrity?  No.  Documents written in the regular course of business are not going to be covered by Garrity.  In prosecution of police officer for beatings and assaults, the government’s introduction in evidence of the arrest report made out by defendant concerning the drug raid in which the complainants were arrested, and his grand jury testimony, did not implicate in any way his right against self-incrimination.  U.S. v. Rios Ruiz, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1978, 579 F.2d 670.
  • What about Force Statements?  One could make the case that Force Statements are compelled testimony as the documents are created as a result of an order specifically related to the act in question.  This is not settled.  It is worth noting that most prosecutors believe these are NOT Garrity protected documents.  This may be a good place to include your own Garrity statement, but may very well turn into a trial-time fight about admissibility.

Is this a special perk of being in law enforcement?  Are police officers given some benefit not available to the average citizen?  No.  Everyone has the right to remain silent pursuant to the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Most people do not have government agents as employers.  Police officers, and other public employees, can be ordered to answer questions posed by government agents or face termination.  Private employers can order an employee to answer questions, but answering those questions does not place a private employee in the position of having to incriminate themselves to a government agent.  One way or another, the fact is that the application of Garrity simply allows police officers and other government employees to make use of the same constitutional protections as everyone else.

There are plenty of resources available on the internet regarding Garrity.  You can download the Garrity case by clicking here (.pdf).  You can download the Schmerber case here (.pdf).

Don’t hesitate to contact your FOP attorney with any questions about Garrity or any other legal issues you may encounter as a police officer.

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U.S. Fifth Circuit Case Alert

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Officer should be aware of the below case.  The Fifth Circuit held that officers who are aware of a constitutional violation can be liable under bystander liability if they fail to intervene.  In such a case, because the law is clearly established, an officer will be denied qualified immunity.  It is additionally a violation of many department policies (including NOPD) to fail to intervene in an unlawful use of force.

Fifth Circuit

Hamilton v. Kindred, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 623 (5th Cir. Tex. Jan. 12, 2017)

Brandy Hamilton and Alexandria Randle were pulled over by Officer Turner for speeding. After Officer Turner smelled marijuana, he ordered the women to exit their vehicle. Hamilton was wearing a bikini bathing suit, and Randle was similarly dressed. Officer Turner handcuffed the women and searched their vehicle. During this time, Officers Ron Kinard and Amanda Bui arrived. After Officer Turner searched the vehicle, he asked Officer Bui to search Hamilton and Randle. Officer Bui conducted a body cavity search on both women while on the side of the road. Hamilton and Randle subsequently filed a lawsuit against the three officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming the invasive cavity searches violated their Fourth Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Officers Turner and Bui reached settlement agreements with Hamilton and Randle. Officer Kindred argued that Hamilton and Randle failed to adequately allege that an excessive use of force occurred. In addition, Officer Kindred argued that he could not be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a bystander for not intervening to prevent the body cavity searches; therefore, he was entitled to qualified immunity.

The district court denied Officer Kindred qualified immunity. The court found that Hamilton and Randle had adequately alleged a claim of excessive force. The court also held it was clearly established at the time of the incident that bystander liability applied. In addition, the court concluded that there was a serious dispute as to material facts in the case regarding the objective reasonableness of Officer Kindred’s actions. Officer Kindred appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

First, to bring a § 1983 excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff must show that she was seized. Here, the court of appeals found that Hamilton and Randle clearly alleged in their complaint that they were seized during the traffic stop when they were handcuffed and placed in the officers’ patrol cars. In addition, the women alleged that they were detained for over thirty minutes and subjected to invasive body cavity searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Second, the court held that Officer Bui’s insertion of her fingers into the plaintiffs’ body cavities constituted a use of force, which the plaintiffs allege occurred during their seizure.

Third, at the time of the incident, it was clearly established that it was not reasonable to conduct a roadside body cavity search, unless there were exigent circumstances that required the search to be conducted on the roadside rather than at a medical facility. Consequently, the court found that Hamilton and Randle alleged facts showing that they were subjected to an unreasonable use of force “excessive to its need.”

The court further held, at the time of the incident, it was clearly established in the Fifth Circuit that an officer could be liable as a bystander in a case involving excessive force if he knew a constitutional violation was taking place and he had a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm.

However, because there were serious disputes as to material facts regarding Officer Kindred’s potential liability as a bystander, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to hear this portion of the case and dismissed Officer Kindred’s appeal.

For the court’s opinion: http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/16-40611/16-40611-2017-01-12.pdf?ts=1484267434
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First Amendment for Public Employees Update

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I was recently contacted by a law enforcement officer asking if I was aware of a case out of North Carolina which ruled in favor of some police officers in regard to a disciplinary action involving posts made to Facebook.  I was aware of this case and I think it is important to put this in context for FOP members in Louisiana.  First and foremost, it is important to recognize that this case, Hebert E. Liverman and Vance R. Richards v. City of Petersburg, et al, 2016 WL 7240179 (not yet published) ,comes out of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.  This is important because the case does not constitute binding precedent for the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit — Louisiana’s court.  This case could be persuasive precedent, but it is not binding.  That means the argument could be adopted by the Fifth Circuit if a similar case were to be brought here, but the court does not have to adopt it.

More particularly, two officers of the City of Petersburg Bureau of Police were disciplined with an oral reprimand and 6 months of probation for violating the department’s regulations on social media.  The department’s regulations on social media read as follows:

J.A. 161 – Negative comments on the internal operations of the Bureau, or specific conduct of supervisors or peers that impacts the public’s perception of the department is not protected b the First Amendment free speech clause, in accordance with established case law.

J.A. 162 – Officers may comment on issues of general or public concern (as opposed to personal grievances) so long as the comments do not disrupt the workforce, interfere with important working relationships or efficient work flow, or undermine public confidence in the officer.  The instances much be judged on a case-by-case basis.

Generally, Liverman made a post on Facebook expressing his opinion on rookie officers being assigned as instructors for his department.  Richards replied to Liverman’s post expanding on that post discussing new officers being placed in specialized units.  Liverman replied again and Richards again replied to Liverman’s reply.

In short, the court held that the Supreme Court set forth how to analyze whether a public employee’s speech was protected speech in its rulings in Pickering and Connick.  There are three questions that have to be answered:

  1. Was the employee speaking as a member of the public on a matter of public concern?
  2. Does the employee’s interest in First Amendment expression outweigh the employer’s interest in the efficient operation of the workplace?
  3. Was the protected speech a substantial factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse employment action?

The Fourth Circuit came to the conclusion that the officers were, in fact, speaking as members of the public on a matter of public concern.  The court went on to conclude that the second and third prongs of the test set forth in Pickering and Connick were also met, making the Facebook comments protected speech.

More importantly, the court held that the regulations themselves were unconstitutionally overbroad.  The reasoning of the court was that the regulations constituted prior restraint of protected speech.  As evidenced by this case, the regulations did lead to discipline of protected speech.

Many of you may have regulations similar to the regulations at issue in this case.  It has long been my belief that these regulations are overbroad and I still think that they are.  This case supports my contention that they are overbroad.  The NOPD regulation on social media reads as follows:

Employees shall not post any material on the internet including but not limited to photos, videos, word documents, etc. that violates any local state or federal law, and/or embarrasses, humiliates, discredits or harms the operations and reputation of the Police Department or any of its members.

It is my opinion that this regulation suffers the same constitutional shortcoming identified in the Petersburg case.  However, the Petersburg case means does not control what happens in Louisiana.  We may, one day, have a chance to argue for a similar ruling here.  But until that happens, please be careful with posts made to Facebook, Twitter, etc.

The Standard for Use of Force

I have heard some talk recently about a need to re-visit the standard for determining whether a use of force by police officers is excessive.  This article in the New York Times written by Yale Law students illustrates the nature of the movement.  Here are some problems with the arguments presented in this article.

At the most basic level, the law in Louisiana does not give law enforcement any extra authority to use force against others except that La. C.Cr. P. Art. 220 provides:

A person shall submit peaceably to a lawful arrest. The person making a lawful arrest may use reasonable force to effect the arrest and detention, and also to overcome any resistance or threatened resistance of the person being arrested or detained.

It is the word “reasonable” which causes consternation for folks such as the authors of the above referenced N.Y. Times article.  Here, the reasonableness referred to is the degree or type of force.  Of course, the flip-side to this article is that people have the right to use reasonable force to resist an unlawful arrest.

In order for something to be “reasonable” it has to be in compliance with the law.  For that guidance, we look to La. R.S. 14:19 and La. R.S. 14:20.  It is important to note that La. R.S. 14:19 and La. R.S. 14:20 are not specifically directed toward law enforcement, but are the general rule that governs everyone within the boundaries of the State of Louisiana.

La. R.S. 14:19 reads as follows:

A. (1) The use of force or violence upon the person of another is justifiable under either of the following circumstances:
(a) When committed for the purpose of preventing a forcible offense against the person or a forcible offense or trespass against property in a person’s lawful possession, provided that the force or violence used must be reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent such offense.
(b)(i) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40) when the conflict began, against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person using the force or violence reasonably believes that the use of force or violence is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(ii) The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply when the person using the force or violence is engaged, at the time of the use of force or violence in the acquisition of, the distribution of, or possession of, with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of the provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
(2) The provisions of Paragraph (1) of this Section shall not apply where the force or violence results in a homicide.
B. For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of force or violence was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the premises or motor vehicle, if both of the following occur:
(1) The person against whom the force or violence was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(2) The person who used force or violence knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using force or violence as provided for in this Section and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used force or violence in defense of his person or property had a reasonable belief that force or violence was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a forcible offense or to prevent the unlawful entry.

Paragraph A(2) tells us that this does not apply if the force used results in a homicide.  For that we have to look to La. R.S. 14:20, which reads as follows:

A. A homicide is justifiable:
(1) When committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger.
(2) When committed for the purpose of preventing a violent or forcible felony involving danger to life or of great bodily harm by one who reasonably believes that such an offense is about to be committed and that such action is necessary for its prevention. The circumstances must be sufficient to excite the fear of a reasonable person that there would be serious danger to his own life or person if he attempted to prevent the felony without the killing.
(3) When committed against a person whom one reasonably believes to be likely to use any unlawful force against a person present in a dwelling or a place of business, or when committed against a person whom one reasonably believes is attempting to use any unlawful force against a person present in a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), while committing or attempting to commit a burglary or robbery of such dwelling, business, or motor vehicle.
(4)(a) When committed by a person lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40) when the conflict began, against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the person committing the homicide reasonably believes that the use of deadly force is necessary to prevent the entry or to compel the intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(b) The provisions of this Paragraph shall not apply when the person committing the homicide is engaged, at the time of the homicide, in the acquisition of, the distribution of, or possession of, with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance in violation of the provisions of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.
B. For the purposes of this Section, there shall be a presumption that a person lawfully inside a dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle held a reasonable belief that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent unlawful entry thereto, or to compel an unlawful intruder to leave the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle when the conflict began, if both of the following occur:
(1) The person against whom deadly force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle.
(2) The person who used deadly force knew or had reason to believe that an unlawful and forcible entry was occurring or had occurred.
C. A person who is not engaged in unlawful activity and who is in a place where he or she has a right to be shall have no duty to retreat before using deadly force as provided for in this Section, and may stand his or her ground and meet force with force.
D. No finder of fact shall be permitted to consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not the person who used deadly force had a reasonable belief that deadly force was reasonable and apparently necessary to prevent a violent or forcible felony involving life or great bodily harm or to prevent the unlawful entry.

Again, I will point out that this is the standard that applies to all within the political boundaries of the State of Louisiana.

Specifically for law enforcement, we look to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in the case of Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386.  Prior to Graham, the court used the test developed in Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, to determine if a use of force by law enforcement was constitutionally excessive.  The test in Johnson required that there be proof that the force was applied maliciously and sadistically to cause harm based on the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

In Graham, the Court decided that the standard should be based on the 4th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution instead of the 8th Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry is whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 387, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1867, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (U.S. 1989).

Folks such as the authors of the N.Y. Times article referenced above, suggest that the law should embody the DOJ’s necessity standard which states:

 

The necessity to use deadly force arises when all other available means of preventing imminent and grave danger to officers or other persons have failed or would be likely to fail.

I think this is an interesting argument, particularly in light of the fact not one officer involved shooting involving an FBI agent has ever been deemed excessive.  See this N.Y. Times article.

The Graham standard has served us well and it should not be disturbed.  If the Graham standard is turned into a necessity standard, I would recommend that everyone in law enforcement get out — unless you work for the FBI.

A Tale of Two Cities; LAPD’s Twelve Year Consent Decree

NOPD car

     In May of 2013 the Los Angeles Police Department was unceremoniously released from a twelve year consent decree in a three-line ruling by District Judge Gary Feess; the same federal judge responsible for extending LAPD’s original time frame from five years to ten, and eventually twelve years. The LAPD was the first municipal police agency to undergo a consent decree after Congress granted the Justice Department new powers to seek injunctive relief by suing state and local governments in federal court – powers extended specifically to address problems in the LAPD that would later be used in binding over 20 additional U.S. agencies in consent decrees.

     “When the decree was entered, LAPD was a troubled department whose reputation had been severely damaged by a series of crises, In 2008, as noted by the monitor, ‘LAPD has become the national and international policing standard for activities that range from audits to handling of the mentally ill to many aspects of training to risk assessment of police officers and more,’” Feess wrote of the release.

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#NOPD Police Details #NOLA #FOP #FOPNO

detail mcEconomic Impact for the City of New Orleans

Sugar Bowl (2012) – $493.73 million (Metro New Orleans) http://www.allstatesugarbowl.org/site.php?pageID=19&newsID=564#.Uy3IA61dViY

NBA All Star Game – $90 million  http://gnosports.com/2014-new-orleans-host-committee-announces-successful-nba-star-game/

Mardi Gras – More than $500 million (Regional)  http://www.wdsu.com/news/entertainment/carnival-central-extended-coverage/new-orleans-prepares-to-implement-new-mardi-gras-rules/24569136#mid=18674480

French Quarter Fest – $259.5 million  http://fqfi.org/about.html

WrestleMania XXX – Unknown – Estimated 80,000 visitors   http://www.neworleanscvb.com/press-media/press-kit/whats-new/

New Orleans Jazz and Heritage Festival – More than $300 million  http://www.forbes.com/sites/adrianalopez/2013/05/06/new-orleans-jazz-fest-comes-full-circle-with-its-mission/

What do all of these things have in common?  The police details which contribute significantly to making these events safe and successful will not be handled by the Office of Police Secondary Employment (OPSE).

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Sample Force Statement #FOP #FOPNO #NOPD @fopno @louisianafop

FORCE STATEMENT

I have been ordered to write this Force Statement by Sgt. FIT Team. Completion of this Force Statement is also required by NOPD Operations Manual PR300.6.1. Had I not been ordered to draft this document, I would have asserted my right to remain silent as guaranteed by the 5th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. In addition, although I have not been advised as such, I am aware that LSA 40:2531(b)(5) makes administrative statements rendered in administrative investigations, such as this use of force investigation, inadmissible in any subsequent criminal proceedings. However, since this statement is being compelled and I would be fired for failing to comply with these orders, I am rendering the below involuntary statement with regard to the events of 01-01-2014 documented under NOPD Item # A-12345-14:

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Open Carry in Louisiana

English: The Bill of Rights, the first ten ame...

The Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution  (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

Recently, I was told about an officer that ran across a citizen carrying a firearm openly.  The officer took what he felt was the appropriate action to address the situation.  In light of the current political climate regarding guns, gun control, the 2nd Amendment, etc., a couple of people indicated they would like to see some further information on the topic of open carrying.  This topic is much simpler than it may seem.

The law that allows open carry in Louisiana is Article 1 Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution and the 2nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Article 1 Section 11 of the Louisiana Constitution was recently amended to state “The right of each citizen to keep and bear arms is fundamental and shall not be infringed. Any restriction on this right shall be subject to strict scrutiny.” La. Const. art. I, § 11.The 2nd Amendment to the United States Constitution states “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”  U.S. Const. amend. II

Without getting too heavy into some type of constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court says that American citizens have the right to keep and bear arms.  “Keep arms” means “have weapons” and “bear arms” means “wear, bear, or carry … upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose … of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.”  Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 584, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2793, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008).  See also McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 2010, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894.

It is allowable to ban the possession under certain circumstances.  LSA 14:95.1 bans convicted felons from possessing a firearm or carrying a concealed weapon (see State v. Clement, Sup.1979, 368 So.2d 1037).  It is likewise allowable to ban carrying a firearm at a school, a school-sponsored function, or a firearm-free zone (see LSA 14:95.2).

However, attempts to prohibit any form of open carry have been overturned as unconstitutional in Georgia and Tennessee.
In this regard, what is legal is defined by what is specifically illegal.  In general, if one is not in violation of LSA 14:95, et seq., one will be protected by the Louisiana Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that the state can regulate how weapons are

Louisiana Supreme Court

Louisiana Supreme Court (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

carried as discussed above:

The statute against carrying concealed weapons does not contravene the second article of the amendments of the Constitution of the United States. The arms there spoken of are such as are borne by a people in war, or at least carried openly. The article explains itself. It is in these words: “A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” This was never intended to prevent the individual States from adopting such measures of police as might be necessary, in order to protect the orderly and well disposed citizens from the treacherous use of weapons not even designed for any purpose of public defence, and used most frequently by evil-disposed men who seek an advantage over their antagonists, in the disturbances and breaches of the peace which they are prone to provoke. There is, therefore, nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires of us a rigorous construction of the statute in question.  State v. Smith, 11 La. Ann. 633 (1856).

The Louisiana Supreme Court also addressed what constitutes concealment.  Basically, if part of the weapon is concealed and part visible, then it is concealed.  If you strap a rifle to your back or holster a weapon on your hip, it is not concealed.

The constitutional right is to bear arms openly, so that when one meets an armed man there can be no mistake about the fact that he is armed. When we see a man with musket to shoulder, or carbine slung on back, or pistol belted to his side, or such like, he is bearing arms in the constitutional sense. Of course there are other examples. These are but illustrations. There is no danger of any jury or court misinterpeting our statute prohibiting carrying concealed weapons, and confounding a case of lawful arms-bearing with one of carrying dangerous weapons concealed, unless verbal distinctions are pressed too far and they are misled by them. A pistol half stuck in a pocket or about the clothes so that it is not fully exposed, even though a part of it may be visible, is carrying a concealed weapon within the meaning and intent of the statute, and that is the language of the charge.  State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259, 260 (1885).

A law enforcement officer who encounters someone who is openly carrying a firearm is going to conduct an analysis as indicated in
T

erry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968),

unless the officer already has probable cause to arrest.  Of course a law enforcement officer is free to speak with whoever he or she choose.  However, that person is also free to not speak back or answer questions.  Once the individual is no longer free to leave, a law enforcement officer would need articulable probable cause to arrest.

I think it is also important to note that one is not guilty of trespass (LSA 14:63) as long as you have express, legal, or implied authority to enter or remain on the property.  A business, by the very nature of being open, impliedly invites people in.  However, that authorization can be revoked at which time it could be a violation of LSA 14:63 to remain.  In the context of this discussion, if an individual was lawfully carrying a firearm openly, it would be legal to walk into the local grocery (as long as it didn’t violate some other law like being too close to a school or in a firearm-free zone).  However, if the store rescinds whatever authorization that person had to enter the store, then it could be a violation of LSA 14:63 to remain on the property (or return later).

The Louisiana Open Carry Awareness League provides these guidelines regarding open carry in Louisiana.  While this is obviously a special interest group, the FAQ’s appear to be decent explanations of the law.

If anyone has anything they would like to add to this discussion, please feel free to comment or let me know directly.  This is in no way meant to be a political statement on my part.  It is simply a recitation of the law as I understand it to be currently and is intended for those tasked with enforcing the law.